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LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOYER ABILITY TO
PAY AS WAGE CONTOUR INFLUENCES
David A. Pierson
and
Thomas A. Mahone}
A single equilibrium wage in labor markets, once accepted as evidence
of competition in labor markets, is viewed today as evidence of collusion.
Ross observed in 1957, "The wheel has turned full circle since Adam
Smith's day. Then ii was deemed important to explain why all workers did
not receive the same wage rate . . . Today it is more interesting 10 inquire
why some workers do receive the ,ame wage as others . . . Generally, the
single rate is a reliable token of combination rather than compe1i1ion al
work."' Observed variation in wage rates, once rationalized in terms of
frictions preventing speedy adJustmems in equilibrium or barriers 10 competition, has been so well documented' that it is accepted today as the norm.
Wage differemials have been associated with geographic location, industry,
occupation, and collective bargaining by focusing upon differences in labor
market supplies and demands, human capital and employee productivity,
and whether or no! wages are bargained collectively.
The study reported here examines a specific example of wage variation,
salaries paid to teacher\ employed in public school districts in Minnesota.
Salaries paid by 427 Minnesota public school districts maintaining graded
elementary and secondary schools to teachers \\ith a bachelors degree and
no experience varied from $7,000 to S8,956 in 1974. with an a,·erage salary
of $8,137.' This variation in salaries exists des pile the fact that occupation,
skills, entry requirements, labor supply, and 10 a great extent technology are
invariant across employers. Thus this study examines wage variations which
exist despite the relative consistency among employing units of variables
commonly identified as source, of wage variation.
The firs! section of thi~ paper describes the wage variation which exists
among employing uni 1, of teachers in Minne,ota and the relative consistency of labor market characteristics, teacher qualifications, and job requirements among employing units. An explanation of wage differentiab
based upo n Dunlop 's concepb of wage contour\ is developed. Hypotheses
concerning wage contour characteristics and behavior are developed and
tested for the period 1962 to 1974.
Wage Struc lure for Tead1ers in Minne~ola
The compema1ion paid teachers in Minnesota, like mm! other states,
varies by degree, years of experience, and employing school district. Each
employing district publishes a schedule annually indicating the rate~ to be
paid for different combinations of educational qualifications and experience. Since our concern is with compensation differentials among
employers, we focus upon entry level teachers with a bachelor degree and no
experience.
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School districts in Minnesota have pa1·d a .d
w1 e range of I ·
for a
num ber of years to entry level teachers w·th
1 a bac helors degresa anes
·
. .
e and no experience. Table I shows the maximu
m, m1mmum and averag 1 .
to teachers with these qualifications for the
, 196
esa anespaid
years
2 to 1974.
TABLE I
En IQ \\ agl' \ ariation Among Ui~tricts in Minnesota

I

1962-1974

I

l

1

\

YEAR

MINIMUM

1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
I 973-74
1974-75

3800
4000
4170
4100
4650
4800
5300
6000

MOO

6i'OO
63()()
6000
7000

MEAN MAXIMUM
4467
5350
4607
5350
4739
5150
4864
5400
5021
5450
5309
6000
5992
67 00
6509
74()()
6966
7825
7148
7825
7243
8000
7349
8250
8137
8956

STD. DEV. NUMBER
194.6
392
188.2
411
169.5
405
163.1
417
147.0
416
148.4
421
142.4
428
179.1
428
184.6
428
201.0
419
220.5
422
263.7
412
204.5
427

~O fl::: Irregular rro~res\lon of minimum ,,nd ma>.imum ,alarie< due 10 incomplete informatmn tram some dhtric1,. District, did not reduce ,alarie, a, migh1 be deduced trom this 1able.
SOURCE: s~e Appendix

The observed variation in teachers' salaries is interesting because many
of the common explanalory , ariables of wage variation are relatively constant acro~s ~chool districts. All teachers included in this study teach in
public school districts "'hich might be viewed as a single industry. Only
districb maintaining graded elementary and secondary schools are included
in the study. The ta~b performed in this occupation are also largely invariant across districts in this sample. Differences in teaching positions (e.g.
different subjects and grade levels) exist within a district, not among
districts. Secondary and elementary distinctions as well as specializations
within the,e categories are employed by all districts. but even these differences within the district are not reflected in salaries since salary schedules
only reflect amount of schooling and experience.
Districts in Minne~ota recruit ne\, teachers from the same labor supply,
a fact which will have significant bearing on our explanation for differential
wage behavior of high and low wage dis1ric1s to be developed shortly. Ne\\
teacher~ possess approximately the same set of skills since all incoming
teachers employed by districcs included in the study have been required to
have a bachelors degree in an approved course of study from an accredited
college or university for all years in che study. Uniform certification requirements established by the Minnesota Department of Education apply to
10

all Minnesot a pu blic teachers and districts. Teachers are certified by area of
specialization, but again these differences exist within rather than among
districts.
The scope of the labor market for teachers in Minnesota is most
realistically viewed as the entire state, and not more localized regions of the
state. All d istricts compete for new teachers from the same supply. The
uniform certification requirements and teacher placement agencie5 serving
the entire state both suggest a statewide labor market.
The maj ority of individuals seeking placement as teachers in Minne,ota
public d istricts each year are graduating seniors from Minne,ota college;
and universities who have earned 5tate certification making this the primary
supply of new teachers for the statewide labor market. In I 968, the last year
such da ta is available, 77 .3% of the certified graduates of Minne,ota colleges and universities who found teaching positions, did so in Minnesota!
This evidence, and similar figures from previous years, indicates that Minnesota graduate~ tend to remain in Minnesota. The,e recent graduates with
only a bachelor, degree and no experience constitute the primary source of
new teachers for Minne,ota public districts as evidenced by the fact that
61.3% of all ne,, hires ,~ere at thi; single entry position, rather than
distributed uniformly acros; all levels.'
Other candidates for re.:ruitment might include candidates from other
states as well a; persons returning to teaching from other occupations or
teachers seeking relocation from other districts. Recruitment of candidate,
from outside of Minne;ota is discouraged, though not prohibited, by the requirement that '>UCh recruit; become certified in Minnesota. And per;ons
with past teaching experience would not be hired at the entry level because
of their previous teaching experience requiring a greater expenditure on the
part of the district.
Based on the above evidence, the entire state is be,t viewed as a single
labor market and graduates of Minne~ota colleges and univer~ities a, the
primary supply for this market. Even though individual; undoubtedly have
preference, for specific locations and assignments within the ~late, it \\Ould
appear likely that there is sufficient mobility and distribution of preferences
that the entire ,tate is best viewed a, a ,ingle lahor market for the purpo,e,
of our analysi~.
The common industry, occupation, ;kills required, and labor ~upply
among Minnesota public school districts make the oh~en·ed wage variation
across these di5tricts intriguing. An explanation for the variation mu,t t,e
consistent with thc;e similarities. The argument proposed and tested in this
paper is that the districts differ in their ability to pay wage, becau,e of differences in what could be considered their product markets. And further,
since the district; recruit from a common labor supply, but differ in their
ability to pa y high wage;, important differences exist between districts
which mo tivate paying high or low wages.
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\\ a~e ( on tours
The importance
•.
. I h of the product market or ability to paY ·in exp1aimng
wage dhI fferentia.,
as
been
well
dornmented
Observing
wage
d'ff
•
· ·
.
1 erenuals
,omev. a_t s1m1lar to tho\e studied in th•~ rc~earch, Dunlop' credited dif~erences in the wages paid to 80\ton truck drivers to the existence of wage
~ontour~. Dunlop noted that truck dnvers in the coal industry, for example
~\ere paid "'age rates of about 75 percent of those paid to drivers in the 01·i
industry.
_ The~e observations indicate that groups of employers recruiting from a
single_ la~or supply_ and employing the same occupation may nonetheless
pay s1gmf1ca~tly d1ftcrcn1 wages. According to Dunlop these employer
group~ conslltute wage contours. clusters of employers paying different
\\age rate, 0\ er time to a single occupa11on and changing "'age rates in common. Dunlop offers several cxplana11ons for employer wage contours. One
explanation relates 10 industry anJ product market. Employers in different
wage contours arc in different indu,1ries and product markets, e.g. laundr)
truck dri\Crs and beer truck drivers. Although not developed explicitly by
Dunlop. \\l'. might infer differential ability to pay wages a\\Ociated with different product markeb, the marginal re,enuc product of labor varying
from one product market and v.age contour to another.
The variation of entry teacher~ \alanes presented in Table I presents
the possibility of wage contours of employmg school districts, ,ome districts
paying consistently higher or lower entry ,alarics than others. A wage contour explanation of salary differentiab in Table I would require that the
structure of salaries among districts remain relatively constant over the
years studied. that certain districts always pay rela11vely high salaries and
others ah\ays pa} relatively lov. salaries. Since all employing umts in 1hi1
,ample are in the ,ame industry. elementary and \econdary education, othtr
mea,ure~ of product market and ability to wages more specific than m·
<lustry ought 10 be associated with different wage contours; these mea\Ure>
art' developed later.
The existence of high and low wage employers compeLing wnhin the
,ame industry for the amc wpply of labor has several mtere~ting 1mphcations. Di~trict\ competing for the ,ame labor supply but offering diffenng
v.age\, might suggest that high wage d1s1nc1s are needle,,ly paying higher
wage., and consequently incurring greater C:\penses than absolute!)
necessary. In the profit sector ,uch behavior would appear to be inconm·
tent with profit maximi,ation principles Recall, though. that Dunlop
observed wage pra1:tices of employers in pm ate industry and found vast
differences in the wages offered by employers in different eontours. The15
practice of offering what might appear to be higher than necessary v.ag~
thu\ not confined to the not-for-profit sector.
Bronfenbrenner provides an explanation of what might appear to be
v.age behavior inconsistent with profit maximizing when he develops a rationale for monopsoms11c employers who do not exploit their monopson)
power, who pay higher wage rates than necessary. Payment of a wage rate
12
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higher than dictated by compet1uve comparisons provides a buffer or
cushion for the employer, buffers that might be profit maximizing in the
long run and which ease labor market constraints in the short run. P ayment
of a wage higher than demanded by competition attracts to the employer a
labor pool larger than neces~ary permitting ~election of the most qualified
candidates. The employer is better able to select those candidates judged
most likely to remain with the organization and/or to perform best. Additionally, attraction of a surplus labor pool permits the employer to expand
employment as necessary without adjustment of the wage, thus permitting
greater flexibilit y in hiring without continual adjustment of the wage rate.
In terms of organizational analysis, payment of a wage rate higher than required by competitive considerations buffers the employing unit to an extent from various environmental uncertainties.' Labor market pressures are
eased and, conceivably, thi\ behavior on the part of high wage employers is
profit maximizing in the long run in so far as it permits more rapid adjustments of the labor force and reduction of personnel recruitment costs.
If districts that consistently offer high wages are indeed buffered from
changes in the labor market several important consequences should be observed. First, changes in the entry wage offered by high wage districts
should be less related to changes in the tightness of the labor supply than are
the entry wage changes in low wage districts. In a general sense, wage~ increase faster in times of a relative scarcity of labor than when there is a
relative abundance of labor. This relationship should be less evident in high
11age districts than in low wage districts since according to Bronfenbrenner
a high y,age policy reduce\ the direct relian.:e of the high wage employer on
the labor supply.
Finding~ of Wachtcr's• inve~tigations of the interindustry wage structure are consistent with the con.:ept that a high \\ age policy buffers labor
supply forces. Wachter found that the spread in wages across industries is
directly related to the unemployment rate, implying that wage changes in
low wage indmtrie~ tend to vary directly with conditions in the labor
market, while wage changes in high wage industries are not as closely
related to changes in labor supply.
The ~econd consequence of paying high wages which is inve~tigated in
this research is an expected difference in the turnO\ er rate experienced by
high and low Y.age diMricts. High wage districts ~hould lose relatively fewer
teachers each year than low wage districts. Districts must utilize the external
~upply of ne" teacher~ to staff ne" positions a\ well as replace teachers who
leave the district. Thus districts with a high turnover rate are more dependent on the external supply than districts \\ith a low turnover rate. A
relatively low turnover rate resulting from paying high \~age\ implies that
the high wage dbtricts are less dependent on the external labor supply.
Evidence of greater turnover among low y,age districts would also indicate that the observed difference in wages paid by high and low wage
districts is a true difference and does not merely compensate for other differences in nonmonetary aspects associated with employment. If turnover
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rates
•
f ofI high
. and· low \\age di~trkts are .the. same • then the tota! cond'1t1ons
emp O}ment in the two group~ of dt,tncts would appear to be
tmatcly the same making thc wage dillerential less meaningful in tcr appoxlabor market buffer.
msofa ·1
_High v.age districts ma} justify the payment of high wages for reasons "
of higher emp!oyee producunty. T~achers receiving higher salaries might be
more productive than teacher, rece1v1ng lower ~alaries thus equalizing I bo
cost per
unit of labor among the different districts. Th'a
ts ex
. standardized
•
.
p Ia~at1on ts not inconsistent with the concept of high wage districts being
b~t_fered trom labor market forces, but is cx1remely difficult to supportcmp1ncally. Thurow's" argument that labor produc1tv1ty is more a function of
the job than of the incumbent appears particularly appropriate 10 the
analysb of elementary and secondary teachers. First, formal job requirements arc defined in terms of education and ewerience and no
recognition of indh1dual variation in performance 1s e,tended in the salary
structure. Likewi,e, certifo:ation requirements apply equally to all districts.
Fina II}", various constraints upon teaching a,,ignmcnts ,uggest only limited
opportunity for , ariation in performance State agency rulings mandate
that pupil-teacher ratios not exceed 30 in elementary schools and 160
students per teacher per day in high schools constraining teacher produc11v1ty measured in term, of the number of pupils taught , Levin and Muller '
found no relationship betv.een teacher salary and class size in \1innesou
di,tricts. It is true that ,ariations in quality of instruction may var> from
one teacher to another, but the~e are subtle difference\ in product, not easi1> measured and not recogni1ed in formal school di,trict reward structur~.
S.:hool dist rich ma~ dis.:ipline teachers latling to meet an acceptable lc\'el of
quality, but no provision 1s made for recognition of positive variation tn

?

\

qualit) of production.
Even though the at gument that paying high wage, attracts a supenor
cadre of teachers is entirely plausible, it is extremely difficult to venfy and ii
not im:onsistent with either the importance of ability to pay predicting high
wage di~tricts or the but fering effect resulting from the high wage policy
made possible by the differential ability to pay wage . The ability to scle-.:l
potentially better tea..:hers rat her than being forced to accept a\'erage or
IO\\Cr applicants would indeed but fer the high wage district from certain
labor market preswn:s.
H~pothe\e~
Four hypothese~ denved from the abo\'C discu\sion are presented here

along with short summaries of the rationale for each or them.
.
Considerable variation exists in the wages paid by Minnesota ~u~lic
school district\ to entry le,el teachers. Dunlop attributed \omewhat sim~lar
wage variation to wage contours, ,table groups ·of employers
w1tbvanauon
similar
d' ·
wage-setting characteristics. We hypothesize the inter 1stnct wage
is not merely reflective of short run wage adjustments, but that Slablc
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groups of districts, simila r to contours, composed o f high a nd low wage
districts can be identified . This first hypothesis is stated as follows:
Ho I: Observed differentials among teacher sala ries in Minnesota
are reflective of different wage contours of employers, certain em ployers consistently offering relatively high salaries
and other employers consistently offering rela tively low
salaries.
Districts in Minne\Ota employ teachers from the same labor supply, require similar skills of nev. teachers which are in the same occupation, and
are all in the same industry. Given these similarities and the observed wage
variation, high wage districts should be differentiated from low wage
districts by a differential ability to pay high wages derived from a more
munificent product market. This is stated in the following hypothesis:
Ho 2: High a nd low wage distncts arc distinguished by a differential ability to pa} high wages.
Districts payi ng relatively high ,.,,age rate\ should be le\s directly influenced by the labor supply for nev. teachers, a benefit derived from their
policy of paying h igh wages. A consequence of this high wage policy consistent with the existence of a buffer against changes in the labor supply is that
high wage districts should experience relatively less turnover than low v.age
districts. This is \lated in the following hypothesis:
Ho 3: High wage districts experience lower turnover than lov.
wage districts indicating that high wage employers are not
as reliant on the external supply of nc" teachers for replacement purpose\ a, arc low \\Uge districts.
Along with experiencing lower turnover, high wage distnct\ should be
less dependen t on change, in the supply of ne,\ teachers when determining
wage changes. Thu~ the v.,age behavior of lo\\ wage districts ,hould be more
highly associated with the tightness of the labor supply. The association between the labor ,upply and entry v.age behavior ,hould be greater in low
Y.age districts than in high \\age districts. Thi- is ,tated in the following
hypothesis:
Ho 4 : High wage districts are
dependent on labor supply
pres,ure, than are low wage di~trict~ a, e\'ldem:ed by a
lov.er association between the \late of the labor supply and
change in entry wage~ in high wage district~ than in low
wage districts.

le,,

Design and Re~ul1 , of till' !}tud~
Data fro m Minne\ota public school distnct\ for the year\ I 962 to 1974,
including teacher~• ent ry v. age, o btained from ~alary schedules. \,ere med
to analyze the four hypothese~ develo ped in the preceding )ection. Specific
analyses a re reported for each hypot hesis.
Ho 1: O bserved differen tial\ a mong teacher ~alaries in Minnesota
have existed over ti me in a relatively consistent manner
re flective o f different wage contours of em ployer~. Certa in
15

d1s1nch .have
relative!", to,.u saIanes
· and
.
. . consistent} offered
other_ district!, have consistently offered relatively h. h
~alanes.
ig
Charac.terization,
of wage contours indicate that emPIayers pay dif.
f
I .
herenl sa anes
b hfor the
. .,amc occupation wi1hin a single tab or mar kcl, and
I at mem er, 1p \\ 11hrn a contour is rela11vel" stable Thus em I
•
h· h
.
.
.
.
' ·
·
P ayers m
1g
\\age
contour,
pa,
relall\elv
high
wa!!,es
for
an
ex1ended
·
d
•
.
· .
•
pcno or
time. L1kew1se employers in low ,,age contours continue a tow \\age r
over a number ~f years. If employees di,play consistent wage policic~:::
an ex1ended period 1he resulting \,age ,1ruciure ,hould be relatively slablc
rather 1han ~ere!). repr~enl short-run adjustmems This policy of consistently paying d1tferen11al wage\ ,hould charac1erize Minneso1a public
,chool d1str1c1, a, ,1ated in the firs! hypothesis.
. The basic en1ry salar} for teachers. 1he beginning wage paid teachers
with a bachelors degree in education, stale cenificalion, and no teaching e~per1ence, 1s u,ed for this and subsequenl analyses. Though 1eachers are paid
the salary appropriale 10 1he1r educa11onal and experience qualifications
mo\! hiring is a1 the entry l,:vel and the salary for this level paid 10 elemen'.
tary :ind secondary teacher, alike is comparable across school districts. The
consis1ency of \\age setting practices of 1'1inne,ota public school dis1rim
wa~ analyzed by observing 1he ,1ructure of enlry wa!).eS of 419 districls for
the year, 1962 10 1974.
Entry wages ,,ere collected on 419 dis1ric1s 1ha1 had main1ained graded
elemen1ar) and secondary ,choob for the years 196::! 10 1974. The results of
1his analysi, are pre~ented in Table 2. Each dis1ric1's entry wage was compared 10 1he s1a1e median cntr~ wage for each of 1he I 3 years. If the district
paid more 1han the ,1a1e median "age 1he d1stric1 \\a, assigned a value of I
for 1hat year, and -1 if 1he district's "age ,,a, less than 1he m1:rl1an. These
,alues were summed for each district for all I 3 years; the possible range of
,·alue\ a district could ha,·e for thi~ summed value {SCTR) y,as the odd
number, from -13 w 13. A districl paying less than the median in all years
recei,ed a -13, whik a district paying more 1han the median in all years
received a I 3. Intermcdiate value~ corre~pond to combinations of above and
belo\\ median .... age payment. {See column 2 in Table 2.) If districts randomly paid above and below 1he median .... ag.e {and thu, showed no con·
\istenq from year to year) 1he \ alues of 1he wmmed , ariables would be
d1stribu1ed a\ a binon11al d1\ tribu11on (the value for each year ts restnc1ed to
-I or I).,., ith p
.5 since a random wage as~i1rnment policy \\Ould result in1
an equal probability of 1ht' yearly variable being either I or -1. (See column
3 and 4 in Table 2.) Cornpanng the actual distribu11011 of the summed
,anable by district acro\s all I 3 years, to an expected binomial dimibution
using a X' goodness-of-fit 1es1. the two distnbu11ons were found to be
significantly different. The value of the test statistic, 4727 .71. greatly e~ceeded the ,alue of X'df=9 a= .01, 31.67. Only nine degrees of freed~m,
rather than thirteen, were us~d so that all cell\ of the expected distributton
(column 4, T able 2) would have a m1mmurn frequency of five" necessitattn&
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TABLE 2

"
1

Goodness-of-Fit Test: Comparhon of Distribution Reflecting Actual Wage
Setting to an Expected Dbtribution without Wage Contours

( 1)
SCTR•

(2)
fo
Observed
Frequency

- 13
- 11
- 9
- 7
5
3

.l

(3)
Binomial
Probabilities••
.0001
.0016
.0095
.0349
.0873
.1571
.2095
.2095
. I 571
.0873
.0349
.0095
.0016
.0001

27}
29
86
30
34
39
27
31
21
18
19
18

+ I
+ 3
+ 5
+ 7
+ 9
+ II
+ 13

26 } 126
28
72

(4)
fe
Expected
Frequencies

.04}
.67 4.69

3.98
14.62
36.58
65.82
87.78
87.78
65.82
36.58
14.62

3.98 }
.67 4.69

.04

Total

(5)
(fo-fe)'/fe

1409.7
25.69
. 16
22.90
36.73
50.80
34.74
8.45
.78
3137.76
4727.71

•see text for definition.
••calculated from binomial expansion (William L. Hay~. Statistics, New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963. pp. 145-146):

n

I !(n-1 )!

where:

n
p
q

)

pqn-1 + qn

13
.5
.5
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outlying
· we con• I • cells in the di,tribution, to be collapsed
· · From 1h,·s a naIysis
l: udc that the . obser\ed
wage \lructure which exists among M.mnesota
.
puhbl
to persist over time \lmilar to a "age
· 1c sc h ooI d 1stncts tend\
.
"
structure
" ,ch
·
· Dunlop
h h characterized a~ being the result of wage contours . o·istncts
paying 1g wage~ tend to do so over the years and districts paying lov.
\\age, tend to do so 0\er the years ,upporting hypothesis I.
The abo\e analysis indicates that a stable v.age \tructure exists amo
.
q
,~1·in~e~ot~ pu b.
he school districts
and thus high and low v.age groups retlecting high and low wage contours can be identified. Hypotheses 2, 3, and
relate t~ expected differences bet\\een high and low \\age districts. The
p,·... ific d1stncts representing the high and low v.agc contours arc identified
from the p~ev,ou~ analysis and arc used in the ,ubsequent analyses. Tv.enty,e\en districts paid less than the qatc median wage in all years of the study
and are identified a, the lo,, \\age contour. One of these distncts had to be
c.xcluded trom sub,equent analyses due to missing data for other variables.
Seventy-two districts paid more than the ,tate median wage for all years m
the study and are identit1ed a, the high v.age contour. To maintain equal
sample sizes, :?6 of the 72 high v.age districts \\ere sampled randomly to
represent the high v. age contour. One of the high wage districts wa, later ex•
duded from the analysi, due to difficulties encountered in data collection.
These 51 districts, 26 representing the low wage contour and 25 a high wage
contour, are u~ed in subsequent analyses.
Ho 2: High and to,, wage districts are di\tinguished by a differen·
tial ability to pay high wages.
The earlier discussion of the similartties among Minnesota public
school districb shov.ed that these districts recruit trom a common labor
supply, are all v.tthin the ,amc industry. and the jobs filled by ne\, teachers
do not differ substantially aero~, di\tricts. Thus the v.age structure analyzed
abo\'e ,hould be a tu net ion of a <lit ferential ability to pay high wages among
the high and lov. \\age district~. High wage di~tncts are expected to have
substantial\~ greater ability 10 pay than low v.agc districts
i:our measures \\ere u,ed to account for a local district's ability to pay.
Local taxation for education in ~1innc~ota is levied on property according
to as~essed valuation, thu, as~es~ed property value of the district (YALU) is
one mea\ure of dl\trict ah1lit} to pay. Ta:,.e~. hov.ever. are paid from per•
,onal or hou,ehold income which ma~ not be related 10 property ,alue An
agricultural communit}. for 1;xample may ha,e relatively high proper!)
rnlues yet relati,ely low per capita income and be unable 10 ,upport a high
propert, 1a, despite the property valuation Thus both hou,ehold income
(HI NC), the second mea,ure of ability 10 pa}. and propert} value influence
the amount of local support for education and partially account for a
district', ability to pa} wages.
State revenue ,hanng, based upon administrative formulas, provides
another source of revenue to school distnCt\ in Minnesota State funds are
distributed on the basis of number of student\ a, well as the districts'
wealth. Wealthy distncts are able to fund a greater proportion of their total
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expenditures locally. Therefore, the proportion of total district revenue provided from state support (ST ATE) provides a third measure of each
district 's ability to pay wage~. Districts which derive relatively smaller proportions of their total revenue from state \OUrccs serve local product
markets which are more willing to commit local revenues than are districts
which rely more heavily on state resources to rnpport their local educational
efforts.
District size (SIZE) measured as the total number of classroom teachers
employed full-time by each district should also be relat.:d to ability to pay
wages. Assuming economies of scale in area, such as physical plant and support staff, large districts can redirect these savings into greater teacher
salaries. District size is thus the fourth mea,ure of each district's ability to
pay wages. The~e four variables should account for a district's membership
in either the high or low wage contour.
Various studie, support the variable~ chosen to mca,ure ability to pay.
Kasper, Landon and Baird, Owen, and Hall and Carroll" found a positive
association between teachers' wages and local community wealth, variously
measured as personal income or property value. Thorton and Lipsky and
Drotning 1' found a positive a ssociation between district size and wage, paid
to teachers, although the latter study did not find mca,ure, of ability to pay
lO be associated with teachers' salaries. The follo\~ing model is analyzed by
discriminant function analysis to determine if the four mea,ure, of ability
to pay differ between high and low wage districts:
CONTit = B1VALUit + B,STATEit + B, HINC'it + e,SIZEit + eit (I)
where:
CONT =Dichotomou, \'ariable indicating high or low wage contour designation
YALU = Property value of di\trict per pupil expressed in I967
dollar,
ST A TE = Percent state aid is of total operating budget
HINC = Average household income in district measured as
average gross l\1inne,01a income per ta.x return in
district expressed in I 967 dollar~
SIZE = Size of district mca~ured as the total number of full time
cla,sroom teacher,
The independent variable, of the discriminant analysis of Equation I ,hould
\ignificantly discriminate contour or group membership, i.e. R~ > 0.
The result\ of the <li,crirninant analysi\ of Equation I are contained in
Table 3. The analysis includes the years 1963 to 1974. Ba\cd on tbc results
of this analysis ,,e conclude that the ability to pay mea,urc~ differentiate
high and low wage district~ in Minnesota.
Ho 3: High wage districts experience lower turno"er than low
wages districts indicating that high wage employers a rc not
as reliant on the external supply of ne" teachers for replacement purposes a, are low wage district~.
Our earlier discussion developed the concept that bigh wage districts
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teac h ers
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· I staffing·
D,~tncts \\Ith a. lo,,er turnover rate would recruit 1·or add.111ona
need s but not tor replacement ~taffing. Thu, if high ..., aged,· 1 · t
d d b ft'
·
s nc s arc •in•
ee
u ered trom the labor ,upply they ,hould be characterized b a I
turn0\'er rate.
Y owcr
. .A t-tcst 1s u,ed to compare the turno\'er rate~ of the two gro ups or
1stncts. The turno,er rate for each district is mea,ured a~ the ratio of
d
teachers not reemployed by the distm:t for a given year relative to the total
~um_bcr of teac_her;~ in the previou, year The average turnover rate for the
-6 high_ w~gc d1stncts tor the year, I %3 to 1974 is 132, and for the 27 low
w~gc ?'strict, f~r the ~ame years it is . 183. The value of the 1-statistic for
this difference 1, 3.772 (p < .01), indicating that lo,, "age districts ex•
perience significant I} greater turno,cr than high "age dimicts and supports
the third hypothesis.
Ho 4: High ,,age districts are less dependent on labor supply
pn:,sures than are \ow wage dl\tricts as evidenced by a
lo" er associatton betv. een labor supply mea,ures and
change in entry v.age, in !ugh wage districts than in low
wage diqricts.
The final hypothesis extend, the behavioral implications of high and
low \\ag, employers drawing from a .:ommon labor \upply Ba\ed on the
earlier discussion that high ,,age districts should be ,omewhat buffered
from the pressure~ and changes of the labor supplv, the~e districts should
not be forced to adjust their..., age, to rctlect immediate changes m the state
of the labor supply.
rwo anal res are presented to ascertain the degree to "'hich the "age
bcha, ior of low wage dimict<, ,s more directly related 10 the labor supply
than is the \\age behavior of high wagt: districts The first analysis examine>
the relauonship between the scarcity of the suppl\ of nc\\ teacher\ and the
yearly relative difference bctv.ecn the a\erage entry v.ages of the high ano
low wage districb. If lov. wage district\ estabfoh wage, v.h1ch direct!~
reflect labor \Upply ..:ondiuom, they v. ill raise their v. age\ ht tie during
penoJs when the supply of m:v. entranh relative 10 demand is great. On the
other hand, when the supply is not large relative to the demand, low "'age
di trict will be forced to increase their \\ages sig111fh.:antly in order to at·
tract a sutfic1ent number of ne..., teachers High wage districts can maintain
a more stable wage behavior since their high v.age policy assures a relativcl}
steady supply of applicants. Consequently the overall wage structure,
mea~ured a~ the relative difference between the average entry y,ages of high
and low wage districts, should vary inversely with the ~upply of nc\\ en·
trant~ to the labor supply relative to the demand for new teachers.
Relall\e scarcity of labor supplies, 1.e. nc"" teachers, is expressed an·
nually as the ratio of new teaching positions staffed in public districts

20

I A UI I•• .J

Oi~cri min ant A nalysi, of Co ntour \lle mber,,hip

re

YALU

ST A TE

HIN C

S IZE
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(Low W age)

7014

60. 1

3757

24 .6

.9979
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Grou p 2 M eam
(H igh Wage)

6756

59.3

5875

187.9

-1.487

295

Standardized Di,criminant
Function Coefficients

.2675

.0253

- 1.0578

-.4756

= .7 157
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.001

STATE

Percent state aid of total operattng budget

YALU

Property \\Calth of di\trict adju~ted by yearly con\Umer price index

HINC
N
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SI ZE

=

Average gros\ Minne\ota income per ta>. ret u rn in district, adjusted by the yearly con~umer price index
Size of di~t rict measured a, the tot.!l number of tead1er\

Sou rces: See Appendix

throughout
relali\·e to nev. entrant, 10 the labor suppy.
I Thcvaluc
f h"
· 1he
· <;late
·
o l 1s rauo 1s 1mersely
related
. .10 the tightne~s of the 1a bor supply. The
..
num b er o .f nc,, po~1uons ,ta fled m. the ,tate is the numbcr of nev. membrn
enroIIed tn the four teacher retirement a,,ocia\Jons in th
em lo d
h
. .
.
c state. All
1·ons " Ncw entrants
Ph )e teac crs paruc1pate m one of the~e a,soc1at
·
to t e labor supply 1s m~asured a, the number of ne,~ graduates from Minnc3ota college~ possessing the neces,ar} qualifica\Jons for teaching m
elemenl~r) or_ secondary schools. 11 The mea,ure of supply is 1usulied in the
abo,e d1 cumon of the appropria1e lahor supply for en1ry 1eachers in Minneso1a.
The initial analysis invesugating the rela1ion of labor supply and v.agc
contour ,upports the tourth h)pothes1s. The product-moment correlation
b~t,,een the relative d~lference in a,erage entry v.agc:5 of high and low wage
d1smct.-, and the rela\Jve scarcity of the suppl) of nev. teachers for all thirteen year5 of the study is -.682 (p < .01 ), mdicaung that the difference bc1,,een a,erage \\age~ of the tv.o -.:ontours declines a, labor ~upplics become
relati,ely ,car..:e. Wage deci31ons \\ere made annuall) b1 all districts v.ith
the exception of 19i3, the econd year of a <,late mandated t"'o year contract period. l-11minating I 973 from the analysis, the product-moment corre\auon obtained is-. 763 {p < .005). Re,ult, of this analysis within a single
industry are consistent wi1h Wachter's' ' anal)~is ot mterindustr~ v.agc different1als.
A more dire.cl in,estigauon of the high ,,age buflering effect m-.ohcs
relating ,,age beha,ior to lahor supply and individual employer parucipa·
tion in the labor market. If annual change in employer .... age levels is Cl·
pressed a, a 1unc1ion of emplo1 er participation in 1he labor market and rclathe scarc11y of lahor supplies, \\C v.ould npecl a clo,er a\~oc1a11on in low
,, age distn.:ts 1han in high \\age districts. Degree or employer par1ic1pat1on
is included m thc relationship since a di,irict hiring many ne\\ teachers ma)
be forced to offer a higher "age to cn,ure 1hat all openings are filled.
Employer participa1ion m 1he labor markc1 (P \RT) is measured a, the
ratio of 1eachmg position, filled m the di,trict {nev. po,1 ions plus replace·
ment,) relauve to the pre\ious year•~ number of eachen employed b) 1he
district. Relati,c scarci1y of labor ~upplies (LABSUP) is mea,ured a, in 1he
pre\'lou, hypothe,is. The dependen1 variable 1, the change in entry v.age
(DE\\ Gl expre,sed as real v.age3, 1.e. yearly \\age rate, are ,,e1ghted by 1hc
annual con,umcr price inde,. A,wming that high v.age, buffer the em·
ployer trom labor market prc,sur1:~. the independent variables should e~plain more of the \'ariance of ,,age change in the tow wage di,tricts than in
the high v.age dis1ricts since high ,,age employers arc less likely to_ change
"age leveb in re,ponse to labor marke1 pressure, This hypothe,1~ 1s t~ted
by separate regression anal)ses of Equa1ion 2 for high and tov. ...,age
districts.
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(2)
where:
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l

l:,.EWG

=Change

in entry wage paid to a teacher with a
beachelors degree from time t-1 to time I, expressed in
1967 dollars
LABSUP = Ratio comparing the number of new entrants to the
state labor supply relative to the demand for ne,\
teachers.
PA RT = Relative participation by the district in the labor market

Equation 2 pools cross-sectional and time-series data. An inherent problem often encountered in such analyses is the possibility of
heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation. The dependent variable is expressed as a first-order difference. As noted by Wannacott and Wannacott,.
this reduces the probability of encountering autocorrelated errors, but does
not guarantee that the data can be pooled. Maddala 10 presents a te,t to
determine if the data can be pooled. An F-test 11 is used to determine if the
residual sum of squares of the pooled data significantly diffeVi from the
sum of the residuals of individual time-series analyses for each district.
Separate analyses were conducted on the high and low wage groups. The
tests for pooling are conducted separately . for the high and low wage
districts because separate regression estimates are required for the high and
low wage contours. The values of the test statistic obtained in thi\ analysis
of the data are .6133 for the'°'" wage districts and .5218 for the high wage
districts. Since the pooled and nonpooled residuals do not differ significantly in either group it is appropriate to pool the data within each contour.
A Chow test" is used to determine if the model in Equation 2 accounts
for significantly different amount, of variance in the two contour~, or
rather if the model is more appropriate for one \ample than the other. This
procedure examines the residuals under the alternative condition~ of combining the data for both group\ and analyzing the group\ separately. Differences in the model in these two condit1om indicate, that it account\ for
variance differently in the rno groups. 1973 is excluded from the analysis
because of the two-year contract explained earlier. The results of the
analysis a, well a, the value for the Chow test arc presented in Table 4.
The labor supply variables account for more variance in entry wage
behavior in the low wage dbtricts than they do in the high wage dbtricts a,
indicated by the values for R' for each of the group~ and the significance of
the Chow test F-ratio. Entry wage beha, ior of low wage district, thus is
more a function of labor ,upply factors than is the entry wage behavior of
high wage district~ consiqent with the notion than high \\age employers are
buffered from the direct influence of the labor supply.
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The change in entry "'age 1s related differently 10 the independent
\ariables in the two groups. The coefficient for I .\BSUP m the low 11,age
group, .3478, diff..:r, significant!} from the corresponding coeffa:1ent in the
high \\ age group, .0558, indicating a~ predicted that the entry wage
beha\ ior of lo"' \\age distnds 1s more closely related to labor supply than 1s
the y.agc behavior of high wage districts." Interestingly, \,age beha\ior of
high "age employer\ is more closely related to recruiting efforts than is the
wage behavior of loY. "'age employers contrary to c,pectations; we can only
specula1e about the rea,on One possible explanation relate\ to the greater
ra1e\ of 1urn0\er ob cr\c:d m the lo\, y.agc contour. Recruiting by high
wage employers is likely 10 reflect planned expansion or replacement 11,ith
changes ba,ed on these expectations, "'hile recrui11ng by lo"' wage
employers is more likely a con,cquem:e of unplanned replacement needs
m.-cessitated by turno\er. Con~equcntly, high \,age districts e,tabfoh wageba,ed on internal staffing needs. Lo" wage districts are not buffered from
the labor market and must ,et "age., more closely reflecting conditions in
the labor market.
('o nclu, io n, a nd Implicat ion,
This study has examined an interesting example of wage variation,
"age\ paid to cntr> level teachers by Minnesota public school districts. The
distncts recruit from a common supply of labor, emplo}- ne\\ teachers
possessing a common set of characteristics which may differ within districts
but not among districts, and the d istr1c1s employ these teachers in positions
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which do no! differ substantially acrms districts. In spite of these
similarities, the districts pay differing entry level wages to these incoming
employees. This situation is interesting both because many of the factors
commonly associated with wage variation are constant across districts and
also because of the implications of employers recruiting from the same
labor supply but paying substantially different salarie\.
Several questions and resulting hypotheses emerge from thi~ situation
and are addressed in this research. First, is the observed variation in wages
merely a renecuon of short-run adjustments or is it renective of stable wage
policies established by the districts wherein some dimicts consistently pay
high wages while others consistently pay low wages? Second. since the
districts are similar in ski ll requirements and recruit from a common labor
supply, can subtle differences in the districts' product markets and resulting
abilities to pay high wages account for !he observed variation?
The third and fourth questions deal with expected implications of the
observed wage variation. Bronfenbrenner observed that some employers
may pay a higher than necessary wage because of the benefits accruing 10
them as a result of such actions. The first hypothesis derived from this concept is that high wage districts ,,ill enjoy a lower turnO\er rate than lo,,
wage districts. consistent with the concept that high wage di~tricts arc
relatively buffered from the external labor supply forces. The second implication of high and low wage diqricts recruiting from a common labor
supply is that the entry wage pattern of low wage districts will he more
directly related to condition\ in the external labor supply than will the entry
wage pattern of high wage districts. When the supply is tight the lov. ,,age
districts must raise their v.age~ significantly upward in order to attract a
necessary supply of new teacher~. \\'hen the supply is loose these low ,,age
dimicts, given the constraint imposed by their limited ability to pay, arc
able to maintain a relatively level wage policy and \till attract new tc.ichers.
Thus their wage beha\'ior is a direct reflection of conditions in the labor
market for ne,\ teachers. Less constrained by ability to pay limitations, high
wage district\ can establish a more consistent wage practice, reasonably
assured of an adequate supply of ne,\ teachers attracted by their relauvely
higher entry level salaries. Thu\ the \\age behavior of high wage districts
should be bs of a rencction of the condition, in the lahor supply.
The analyses conducted using data from the years 1963 to 1974 showed
considerable support for these hypotheses. Districts as a whole di\play consistent wage practices indicating that the observed ,,age variations do not
represent short run aberallons hut rather a reasonably ,table wage structure
wherein low ,,age districts tend to pay low wages from one year to the next.
while high wage districts consistently pay high wages. Isolating two groups
of districts, one which paid exclusively low wages and the other exclusively
high wagt's, ability to pay measures could be found which highly
discriminat ed hctween membership in tht' high and low wage group,. These
groups display similar characteristics to what Dunlop termed wage contours
since each is a group of employers with common wage setting practices. The
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. a.,,ociated with labo r supp}_
!actors
than
1s
the
\,age
beha\lor
of
the
high
\,age districts. These fin1
d~ng, 1~dicate that a high \,age policy hulfer, the employer against the
direct impact of lahor supply forces. High wage districts do alter their
wage'>. hut appear 10 do ,o 1n relallon 10 their ind1\idual rccruillng needs
rather than in e,pon,e to the dictate, of the labor ,upply.
Se,C!ral 1mphcation, tollo\\ directly trom these findings. The most important 1mphca1ion inrnl\'es the impa.:l of labor supply factors on
employer,. Robm,on' ' ha, ,1a1ed 1ha1 the coni:ept of a local labor market 1s
made u111cnablc by the ob,er\·ed c:-..istence of \,age ,ariation. This research
md1ca1es that factor) in the lahor '> Uppl) are indeed rele\ant, but they impact employers d1 fferentiall}. Emplo) er, with hm11ed mean, mu'>I closely
mon11or i:ondition, \\ ithin the labor market \\ hen c,tabli,hing wages. Since
these employers mu\t compete \\ ith all other employers acce,smg the supply
tor ne\, employees. they mu,1 ~et a \,age which is just high enough 10 a11rac1
a \Uitable supply of labor but not ,o high that they ,urpa,s their limited
ability to pay. Consequently they mu'>t raise their wage, during tight labor
market conditions m re,pon,e 10 the competition of other employers, but
are able to le,el their wage~ during periods characterized by a loose market
and, due to the ,urplu, ,upply of labor. are able 10 attract a ,umc1ent wpply of labor. Therefore, the local labor mark.cl ha, great comequences for the
IO\\ wage emplo}er and .:an be used to predict the wage level e,tablished by
th1, employer.
Specific fa.:tor, in the labor marke!t apparently ha"e le'>'> .:on,equence
for the high "age employer because the high \\ age a,,-ures this employer of a
relatively .:on,tanl tlow of applicants regardle,~ of the condn1ons in the
labor suppl). These employers are able to e,tabli'>h ,table and consistent
\,age panerns whi.:h arc based on the employer's O\\O needs as well as
per hap, the Jong run pancrns dc,eloping within the labor mark.ct.
Therelore the lo.:al labor mark.et is an important .:om:epl for predicting the
wage level of employers \\ 1th a limitc:d ability to pay, but ha, less impor·
tan.:e in predicting the \,age pa11crm of employer~ with a more munificent
product market resulting in a greater ab1hly 10 pay.
Thc,e findings suggc,1 that contingency 1hmk.10g may be useful in
building wage determination models just as it has aided organiiation and
management theory dc,elopmenl. If employers ,hare some aspects of a
common environment, but differ significantly in other .:hara.:1cns11cs, then
those employers would be expected 10 establish their wages ba,ed upon the
specific situation which they confront. Just as one organizauonal c~nfigurallon b not be~t ,uited 10 a ll organi,ations even within a single in·
dustry, wage setting poli.:ies should be expe.:ted 10 rene.:1 the specific situ~tion dealt with by the employer. Enviro nmental factors, be they economic

26

or political, are important to all organizations. But the manner in which
each organiza tion deals with these factors is a function of numerous considerations which the organintion may or may not share with other seemingly similar organization~.
A note of caution must be inserted regarding thr generalization of the
results of this study. The longitudinal nature of the data analyzed
strengthens the study since behavior over a significant time period is
studied . H owever, public school districts differ in what might be significant
ways from employers in other industries. School districts are not profit producing and thus their wage setting characteristics may not corre~pond to
profit making organizations. Thu s high wage school districts may e,tablish
high wages even though it is overly costly to do so. Profit making employers
may not enjoy this opportunity. However, districts are pre~umably co~t
minimizers since they mu\t answer co the community which supports them.
Thus the results of this research may apply to profitmaking organizations as
well. Further research \\ith the profit ~ector is needed before this question
can be answered definitively.
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Econometrics, pp. 194-201 .
" I-tests were u~ed to de!ermine y,hether the coefficient~ differed
significantly betweeen the high and low wage districts. The \alues of the test
~tatistic for each variable are: LABSUP, 3.073 (p < .01); PART, 2.014 (p
< .02).
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''Derek Robinson, "External and Internal Labor Markets," in Robin\On (ed.) Local Labor Markets and H/age Structures, (London: Gower
Press, 1970), pp. 28-67.

Data ~ource~

Entry Wages for each district:
'.'v1innesota Education Association, .\-linnesota Salary Schedules, (St.
Paul: Minne~ota Education Association, Negotiations Department
Research Office March 1975) and previous editions for the years 1963 to
1974;

Jl.tinnc~ota School Boards Association, Studies on Salaries and Related

Information: 1974-1975, (St. Peter, Minn.: \1innesota School Boards
Association, I 975) and previous editions for years I 963 • 1974.
Size of dbtri,ts (number of teachers):
Ar1.:h1, al data from \1innesota Department of Education, St. Paul,
Minne,ota.
Average Gross Minne~ota ln,ome Per Tax Retu rn :
Commissioner of Revenue, The 1974 ,\.linnesota Individual Income

Tax, (St. Paul, Minn.: State Department of Revenue, 1975), Income Tax
Bulletin No. 43, and additional copies for years 1963 • 1973.
Property Wealth of District and Pen.:ent State Aid of Total Operating
Budget:
Archival data from Minnesota Department of Education, St. Paul,
:vtinnesota.
Turnover:
M inne~ota School Boards Association, Study on Salanes and Related

Information: 1974 . 1975, (St. Peter, Minn.: Minnesota School Boards
Association, 1975) and previo us editions for years 1963 • I 974;
Archival data from Minnesota Department of Education, St. Paul,
Minnesota
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·1

Number of Filled Teaching Positions in Minnesota:
Obtained as new members of teacher retirement associations in Minnesota. Data obtained from archival records of the Minnesota, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth teacher retirement associations.
Number of Graduates from Minnesota Colleges and Universities with
Teaching Degrees:
National Education Association, Teacher Supply and Demand in
Public Schools: 1972. (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association,
I 973), additional copies from years 1962 - 1971.
Archival records of l\linne~ota Institutional Teacher Placement
Association.
David A. Pierson is an As,i~tant Professor of Industrial Relatiom and
Organizational Behavior at Temple University. Thomas A. Mahoney is
Frances Hampton Currey Professor of Organization Studies, Owen
Gradua1e School of Management at Vandcrbth University.
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